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Abstract
The Covid-19 pandemic has revealed and accelerated an information crisis as well as a
health one. What we discover about Covid 19, how it spreads, to whom and why and how
best to mitigate it—all depend on information. The essays in this special section, which this
article introduces, explore the importance of information and the fundamental role of fact
checkers in understanding how information flows, why mistakes are made, and how to
counteract them. Fact checking as an idea and a practice emerged in the early twenty-first
century, developed as a positive beacon to counteract a growing sense that information
could no longer be trusted. Now, more than a decade after its creation, fact checking sits
within a far more complex and chaotic media context, and its expertise and understanding
has never been so important. We need to understand what fact checkers do because they are
grappling with how to tether us to reality.
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COVID-19 SPREAD lethally fast when it might
have been contained because of an informa-
tion failure. Right from the start, had what
was known been shared, the pandemic could
have been contained. Handling the crisis has
been beset by models built on insufficient
data and confused public health messaging.
It has been accompanied by the alarming tri-
umph of conspiracy theories which under-
mine understanding and dangerously
impede protection and recovery, and the
politicisation of public health and science. In
the UK, the government’s unwillingness to
share complete information and to hold, cos-
tively, on to a centralised plan also left a gap
for misinformation and suspicion to flood in
its place. Covid-19 has posed the problem
and indeed the opportunity of communicating
intelligently about the uncertainty involved
in assessing information given to the public.
Uncertainty is at the heart of politics and
yet, rather than including the public in a
realistic conversation about risk, the UK gov-
ernment continued saying it knew best
(when it evidently did not). Information is
not some mysterious material that specialists
wield to ‘make’ policy; rather, changes in
how it is accumulated and moved around
the national and international political sys-
tem are re-shaping political realities. While
this collection of essays was largely written
before the pandemic, the virus has revealed
and accelerated an information crisis that
fact checkers were already pioneering work
on—which makes these essays especially
timely.
‘Facts’, as every academic knows, are com-
plicated things—frequently in a trivial way.
But fact checkers are not simple-minded pos-
itivists because they talk about facts. Where
do ‘fact checkers’ fit in the system of knowl-
edge making, testing, and acceptance? They
are relatively new interventions, often chari-
tably funded, that have attempted to act in
the public good within systems of knowl-
edge creation and verification. They may
take bad reporting to task, but they support
good reporting; they may expose misleading
government information, but they intend to
improve it; they are not regulators, yet they
hope to have a regulatory function. They sit
beside other initiatives such as freedom of
information (FOI) legislation and the Infor-
mation Commissioner which had been
intended to help make information more
secure, available and, consequently, more
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3, July–September 2020
© 2020 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC)
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative CommonsAttribution License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in anymedium, provided the original work is properly cited.
578
used and reliable. Yet, in the US, where
there is a more extensive FOI regime than in
the UK, this transparency has not improved
the wider issue of public understanding. We
need to examine these long-term interactions
more imaginatively and urgently.1 Fact
checkers are more public-facing than these
bodies. As Will Moy of Full Fact told a
House of Lords committee:
Bad information can ruin lives. It damages
people’s health. It promotes hate and it hurts
democracy. We now see people suffering
from curable diseases because they have
been misled by false information about vac-
cines. There is false information about public
health issues related, for example, to the roll-
out of 5G mobile communications technol-
ogy. We see terrorist attacks sometimes
promoted by people who have been radi-
calised by false information online.2
What we discover about Covid-19, how it
spreads, to whom and why, and how best to
mitigate it—all depend on information. Yet,
the virus has exploited fissures in societies and
raced through vulnerabilities left by pre-exist-
ing inequality. It has exposed what we knew
but had chosen to ignore. How we individu-
ally, collectively, socially, politically, and inter-
nationally cope with it depends on what we
know and how we understand it. Previous
pandemics were often managed by great
infrastructural developments: sewers and clean
water for cholera; draining marshes and living
in cities for malaria; and this one will require
a new infrastructure settlement, but this time
it will be of information, not materials.
Good fact checkers are on the side of the
public interest in this new world. We need
what they do, but we need what they under-
stand even more. They know that accuracy
requires a resistance to self-deception and
wishful thinking. They know how things
move on the information highways. Their
understanding of how corrupt information
circulates has been developed by practical
experiment. We need to learn, generalise (and
scale up) from what they have painfully dis-
covered in a very fast-moving situation about
how information is generated, how it sticks
to whom, how best to combat the malign and
disruptive effects of bad information. Bernard
Williams asked in 2002, ‘Can the notions of
truth and truthfulness be intellectually
stabilised in such a way that what we under-
stand about truth and our chances of arriving
at it can be made to fit with our need for
truthfulness?’3 The problem he believed he
was addressing was the flawed allegations of
some jejune but widely accepted claims of rel-
ativism. But it turned out that he was posing
the central political problem of the first part
of the twenty-first century.
Fact checkers and authority
Fact checkers fight against the contemporary
tendency of all discussions to dissolve into
torpid cynicism; they battle with entrenched
fanatical beliefs. Febrile disputes about ‘facts’
have dis-orientated whole areas of knowl-
edge.4 There is a paradox at the centre of
their work: more information and reliable
ways of checking and understanding infor-
mation are available than ever before and
citizens ought to be (may even be) far better
informed than at any time before. Yet, good
information no longer drives out bad. Fact
checkers began as people who wanted, for
various reasons, to inoculate democratic sys-
tems against misleading information, but
have found themselves willy-nilly in the
middle of a bewildering new information
revolution. Bad information is a now glob-
alised problem with national consequences.
What is happening to the structure of
understanding? Experimental research sug-
gests correcting information can correct pub-
lic belief in that information most of the
time.5 But it is not enough to put out fact
checks. As Amy Sippett and Will Moy argue
in their essay, fact checkers have found that
it is more effective to work back up the sup-
ply chain and attempt to improve the quality
of originated information and reduce the fur-
ther spread of bad information by influenc-
ing, frightening, and setting constraints
around policy makers, politicians, and
others. Fact checkers understand that investi-
gating why mistakes are made, whether they
are intentional or accidental, and explaining
the processes behind errors, is vital and edu-
cational—that the more everyone across the
system understands the processes better, the
more scepticism will be well-based (as
opposed to rampant and dangerous cyni-
cism). They begin to understand how false
beliefs have got such traction.
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Yet much of what they do is positive. In
this way ‘regulation’ is not merely about
stopping bad things, it is about making good
things happen. For example, in the UK the
regulation of broadcasting has made broad-
casters serve audiences with a wider menu
of quality programmes and constrained them
usefully to serve audiences as citizens rather
than mere commercial cash generators. It has
held ‘news’ to a standard by widening the
scope of reporting. Regulation has helped
make broadcasting a public service. This is in
stark contrast to the economic model of
advertising in the past and social media viral
advertising now. In this way fact checkers are
trying to ‘regulate’ information in a positive
way. Fact checkers are also in the forefront of
exploring the new shapes of legitimacy. If
authority is dispersed in the new information
system, but legitimacy matters, fact checkers
are mapping the new territory and looking at
how good quality information is supplied
and where and how trust can be built in it.
Political parties, scientists, and governments
interested in the public good need to under-
stand this novel architecture. Fact checking
that is well done and researched is a practical
experiment in reforming how societies under-
stand information.
Yet, as Amy Sippitt and Nic Dias also
show in their important essay in this collec-
tion, academic research and fact checking
could be better aligned. While behavioural
science has tended to investigate micro-be-
haviour in the experimental tradition and
reveals many important aspects of how
beliefs get formed and transmitted, it is
abstracted from the context of the live world
of rapid change. It ignores the causes or
impact of larger shifts that have taken place,
even in the last hectic five years, to political
systems and the parameters of political beha-
viour. Nor is there much useful research in
this tradition, at least, on the formation of
elite attitudes and beliefs. Perhaps fact check-
ers need to be open to historical and political
analysis of shifts, and academics more
adventurous methodologically.
We have barely begun to explore the neces-
sary philosophical underpinnings to protect
the public interest in information exchange
and commoditisation. There is an impover-
ished public discussion about the legitimacy of
collecting information, holding and using it—
by whom, for what purposes, and with what
constraints. Unthinking libertarianism clashes
with unthinking centralism. Yet, there are also
other kinds of well-developed understanding
of the obligations and decencies of managing
information that we have barely begun to use:
‘old fashioned’ archivists, the people that
make history possible, by finding, storing, cat-
aloguing, and making available material, have
well-developed ethical and practical codes we
can learn from. But then, the digital graveyard
may be wrecking our capacity to use archives
to establish past events. This is not a narrow
‘academic’ concern—for example, the Hills-
borough Inquiry finally arrived at justice
through revealing attempts to tamper with
evidence uncovered in the archive. Of course,
‘facts’ as any historian, archivist, political sci-
entist, or careful thinker knows, need inter-
pretation and contextualising. But this is
exactly what fact checkers are attempting to
do. Fact checkers are another group of people
who understand much about the fast-moving
ways in which information can be manipu-
lated and how it sticks. For better policy we
need better principals and we need to build
coalitions of actors, including fact checkers,
who understand how in practice the public
interest needs to be protected. Our magnifi-
cent capacity to use the vast new sources of
information for good purposes will have to
be fought for. Good information infrastruc-
tural change is the priority.
As Covid hit, we were already in a global
pandemic of false information, inflamed feel-
ings, widely-believed conspiracies, when the
progressive view that good information
would inform policy and drive out the
merely stupid or wrong or bad has faltered.
Fact checkers were already finding ways of
operating in this developing world. Yet,
Covid has accelerated the danger that
science may be further subsumed in the cul-
ture wars conflict in which everything is
politicised. Meanwhile, hostile foreign pow-
ers deliberately spread false information and
undermine views for malign purposes.
Merely destabilising knowledge and disrupt-
ing trust has an enormous impact on beliefs
and behaviours—and ripples out from the
first suspicion to contaminate what had pre-
viously felt like secure and reliable informa-
tion. So, what fact checkers begin to
understand about building trust is also vital.
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Where fact checking came from
The emergence of fact checkers was a
response to the sense that information could
no longer be relied on. There was a new,
grinding, disjunction between the model of a
democratic public—relatively well-informed
and relatively capable of arriving at rela-
tively good judgements about its interests
and the collective good—and what seemed
to be happening, that the very basis of
democratic opportunity, the capacity to
make independent judgments on a fairly
informed basis, was being eroded. By the
early 2000s, sections of the media (in the UK
the tabloid press, in the US tabloid radio
and TV, in India and Pakistan raucous TV,
in Latin America and many other places, a
media that was in effect the propaganda arm
of business and political groups) were
behaving as if they could make and break
anybody, say anything, make anything up,
with impunity. Fact checkers originally
emerged as a corrective to what, then,
looked like a smaller-scale political problem.
Some politicians, some in public life, and
some media were distorting evidence more
flagrantly than in the recent past. This, in
turn, had the capacity to undermine the
independence of regulatory authorities from
statistical to legal.
Fact checking as an idea and a practice
has a history: these organisations emerged
more or less at the same time in the first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century (although
there has been a recent explosion of them).
Each national fact checker was an interven-
tion into the particular settlement of media,
politics, and information in that country.
This collection of papers demonstrates some
of that variety. They largely believed that
voters and citizens could be trusted to make
responsible judgements of their own interests
if they had access to accurate information.
In the UK at least, the launch of fact
checking was part of a wider uneasiness that
launched a series of organisations (from The
Media Standards Trust, to Channel 4 Fact
Check, to Full Fact and that ultimately lead
to the Leveson Inquiry). Some of the most
important parts of the new system appeared
at a similar time: fact checking, FOI and the
monitoring site Theyworkforyou.com were
all created or implemented in 2005. Fascinat-
ingly, they came about because the individu-
als who set the organisations going sensed a
perturbing shift in mores that they also
believed could be corrected. This was an
interesting example of generational experi-
ence: although fact checking organisations
are inevitably led by younger people, they
were launched by an older, experienced gen-
eration. Who, observing a new dis-inhibition
in parts of the press and a damaging impact
on policy, felt a decline from some previous
expectation of habits and standards. These
pioneers were acutely aware, perhaps, of the
unwritten lines in the sand that were the
most significant pillar of the UK’s unwritten
constitution. Peter Hennessy had said that
‘The British Constitution is a state of mind
. . . It requires a sense of restraint all round
to make it work’.6 This flotilla of tiny organi-
sations was launched to re-enforce such
informal, but critical, lines in the sand.
In the UK Full Fact learnt from American
fact checkers, but also started from a premise
that politicians and public servants would
prefer to be accurate. There was a kind of
innocent naivety in the approach which has
been: ‘Why did you get that wrong?’, and to
the public who needed to understand how
evidence was constructed: ‘Why is it some-
times hard to see what is wrong?’. As
recently as the early 2000s, at least in the UK
and the US, there was also strong residual
belief in the power of shame, that there
would be penalties, dishonour, and loss of
power if you were to be shown to be delib-
erately altering facts, and this would correct
the system. In the UK fact checking has been
corrective and instructive, not accusative in
tone. Fact checking processes were seen as
having both a prophylactic and disinfectant
effect. Yet, it soon became clear that fact
checking was inadequate—that it was neces-
sary to seek action, correction, and to
address the systematic causes, not just the
episodic symptom of a ‘wrong’ fact. In the
UK Full Fact, for example, looked up the
political system to bring a novel kind of
direct accountability.
Fact checkers have seen this human scale
of intervention blown away by the internet
and social media—as well as the exploitation
of the manipulation of information by
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political players in new ways. The social
media make information networks appar-
ently intimate and personal, the possibilities
for organisation far larger, and the potential
for believing far more complex. The whole
ecology has shifted. Fact checkers are now
grappling with far larger structural problems
in information alongside the more topical
ones. They are also dealing with the world’s
largest companies ever—Facebook and Goo-
gle, while Twitter now fact checks the Amer-
ican president. The issue is the capacity to
bring public interest policies to bear on such
vast, secretive and powerful commercial
firms, and to identify what the systemic
solutions need to be.
Information politics
Fact checkers are one set of players in a
rapidly changing environment, which poten-
tially challenges the ‘uneasy’ relationship
between truth and democracy.7 The ‘watch-
dogs’ can be formal bodies or informal
groups of activists, loose groups or what
Michael Schudsen calls ‘political observato-
ries’.8 In the UK, these can be statutory bod-
ies, such as the Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority and the Information
Commissioner, journalistic groups, such as
the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, or
new kinds of campaigning organisations
such as Citizens UK or 38 Degrees. Indeed,
they are closely related (although uncomfort-
ably) to the public interest media. Their
motives are similarly varied: they can be
partisan or objective; draw on various data;
and act as gatekeepers for information or as
activist facilitators. But although fact check-
ers can be advocates for the public interest
up the political system, they have a clear
public face. The public knows what they do.
Fact checking nevertheless emerged in dif-
ferent places and in enormously different
information systems: the notion of ‘fact
checking’ (which sounds unitary) is very var-
ied. In some places there was no access to
‘clean’ information. In Africa, commercial
development is simply impossible in a cor-
rupted information ecology, and one task
was to make such information accessible, as
Peter Cunliffe-Jones shows in his piece. In
Argentina, Chequeado emerged when the
media and the government information
systems were overrun by political partisan
allegiances (and where really fundamental
economic data were missing). Its vision and
success have become a beacon across Latin
America as the essay in this collection
demonstrates. Of course, there are major
information providers and sellers with no
fact checking at all.
Fact checking organisations also under-
stand (and this is surely part of the uncom-
fortable complexity of the new information
settlement) how deliberate, malign (and for-
eign) attempts to interfere in public under-
standing and trust in information work.
What started out as domestic reforming
organisations have become willy-nilly inter-
national operators.
Where next for fact checking?
Many components of the information system
have been under sustained pressure for some
time. Much of what goes under the name of
‘journalism’ is mendacious and mere propa-
ganda. The long-running collapse of the eco-
nomic basis for quality investigative
reporting has accelerated during the Covid
pandemic. Everywhere, journalists have been
sacked and reporting engines shut down for
lack of revenue. Yet, without the investiga-
tive capacity of proper journalism and the
testing of information that goes with it, we
will become even more stupid. Fact checkers
and public interest investigative reporting
are complementary.
The vast tech companies first stole content,
then the advertising, and then the attention
of audiences. Their deceitful slights of hand,
passing themselves off for commercial
advantage as ‘neutral’ conduits, when they
were maximising traffic in ways that have
undermined democracy, was not inevitable.
On the one hand, there was a political and
administrative failure to recognise what was
happening. On the other, a public compli-
ance with things that became indispensably
useful. This refusal to see them as publishers
with responsibilities has damaged our capac-
ity to know ourselves or even understand
what information systems are doing to us.
This makes it easier for politicians simply to
deny reality or call it ‘fake’. In the new polit-
ical settlement that is emerging, ‘authority’ is
dispersed (except in authoritarian systems).
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A far longer engrained suspicion of all of
this has huge effects for our political sys-
tems, and those are playing out in front of
our eyes.
Fact checkers, by attempting to intervene
effectively in this territory, came to under-
stand the systematic pressures on under-
standing and knowledge. Indeed, there are
some signs that there are shifts: Twitter and
Facebook are now working to take down or
demote false or dangerous material (if only
for reasons of economic pressure). Facebook
has a third party fact-checking scheme,
working with independent fact checkers to
check content on the platform and to down-
rank it when it is false so that fewer users
come across it. But we need a new interna-
tional information settlement (one not merely
decreed by the tech firms). We need local
legislation, transparency requirements, better
public education, and we need bigger and
more ambitious policy that helps us use, not
be used and sold by, the new wonders of
information plenty. Fact checkers are grap-
pling with questions of how to scale up their
work in this new age, how to respond at the
speed required, and how to manage the
increasingly internationalised information
system.
Like much else during Covid, the opportu-
nity to have a frank public conversation
about information has not been used as well
as it might. Slightly bewilderingly, after the
deceptions in campaigns of the last four
years, the British public have been treated to
earnest, but snappily produced government
adverts everywhere, warning us about false
rumours and incorrect information. This
must have been refreshing work for British
public servants, a reminder of older ways. In
the wider sphere of the attempt to manage
the virus, sadly the familiar pattern of blame,
lack of frankness, and distortion, have re-
emerged. Yet, the only way to live with the
virus and not die from it is to use and
understand information, and there has been
a surge in public interest in fact checking. If
fact checking needs international standards
(because such an attractive idea can also be
stolen and corrupted), and it needs better
relationships with academic research, per-
haps it also needs to build coalitions of the
interested, for it probably needs better policy
making to assist it.
Fact checkers, in all of their variety and
capacity, have been in one information front-
line for some time: they understand the
nasty underside of contemporary political
structures. Their work is not over there, not
narrow, not specialised; it is about the most
fundamental building blocks of political sys-
tems today. They are concerned with telling
the true from the false, with sincerity—lar-
gely a matter of will and morality—and
accuracy. But above all, they are exploring
how complicated evidence is, how beliefs are
now structured, how fabulations take hold,
and they want to understand how the truth
can be convincingly told. They are trying to
understand how to tether us to reality.
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